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MR: Mark Robinson (Respondent) 
 
 
Part One: 
  
SO: This is Sue Onslow talking to Mr Mark Robinson on Wednesday, 17th 
July 2013 in London. Mark, thank you very much indeed for coming in to 
Senate House to talk to me. I wonder if you could begin by saying, 
please, how you were recruited to the Commonwealth Secretariat in 
1977. 
 
MR: I was recruited by the Commonwealth Secretary General. He was introduced 
to me by the American Under-Secretary General at the UN, Brad Morse, who 
had been an American Congressman and whom I had worked for as a 
congressional intern. I was sitting in my room in the Executive Office of the 
UN Secretary General when Sonny Ramphal was brought in by Brad Morse, 
and Brad said, “I’m going to leave you alone because Sonny’s got something 
rather special to ask you.” So, I shut the door, sat down, and he said, “I want 
to get Observer Status for the Commonwealth Secretariat at the UN in New 
York.” So, we chatted for a little bit and I said, “Look, when are you next in 
New York?” He said in about three weeks and I said, “Right, there’s no point 
talking about this now. I will research this and have all the answers for you in 
three weeks.” Well, three weeks later I was summoned to Ramphal’s hotel 
suite by Moni Malhoutra, head of Ramphal’s Private Office, [who said], “The 
SG would like to see you.” I said, “Are you staying also?” “No, no; it’s very 
private.” I went in and I told Ramphal what I had found out about – how to get 
UN Observer Status. He said, “How long will it take?” I said, “Normally, about 
ten years, Sonny.” He said, “But I want to get in by September.” I said, “You 
have a chance.” 
 
SO: Why was there such a rush, do you think? 
 
MR: Ramphal was very anxious to get the Commonwealth greater recognition at 
the UN and I told him, “You’ve got a chance, because the PLO is being 
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admitted and Yasser Arafat is coming and Kurt Waldheim is almost desperate 
to have somebody else. So, I think we can pull this off.” 
 
SO: How did you achieve that? 
 
MR: The application simply had to go through the bureaucratic works of the UN. 
The Commonwealth Secretariat had to fill out details and everything about the 
Secretariat, including the work that it is doing. [With] that done, there was no 
hitch. ‘C’ came before ‘P’, so Sonny was introduced into the General 
Assembly first and Arafat second. I was sorry I couldn’t be with him because I 
had to be at Waldheim’s side when Arafat arrived by helicopter in the UN 
garden. He came backwards down the helicopter’s steps, the wind blew and 
he had a gun in his belt. I said to Waldheim, “Oh, dear. Press photos that are 
going to go all around the world” – which, of course, they did. After that, the 
next time Ramphal was in New York he asked to see me. He said he knew 
that I had political ambitions in the UK and that I wanted to come back to 
London. Would I come and work in his private office and get there in time for 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to be held at Lancaster 
House before the end of 1977? I arrived about one month before the 
CHOGM, having exercised my right to be repatriated by sea on the last leg of 
the QE2’s jubilee world cruise. This right was rescinded shortly after that, so 
as someone said at the time, “Some people have all the luck”!  
 
On arrival in London, things were very awkward as my mother was ill and 
clearly dying. At the Secretariat, Moni didn’t appear terribly keen on having 
someone else around, so I was put in the East Wing with the International 
Affairs Division. His people management was never strong. Working with the 
Secretary General when you’re not around his office proved to be a real 
challenge, but then a few days before CHOGM, Janet Singh – Ramphal’s PA 
– rang me and said SG wants to see you and he told me, “You’re not to leave 
my side during CHOGM. There are two chairs behind me. One will be shared 
by the Deputy Secretary General Emeka Anyaoku and Moni. The other is 
yours.” He also said, “You come with me to the Retreat. I’m only allowed to 
take two: Janet, and the second one is you. Your job is to keep your ear to 
the ground. I will give you tricky political assignments.” And that’s how I came 
to know Jim Callaghan, as I was sitting behind the Prime Minister as well. 
 
Just a quick forward flash… You’re not meant to make a controversial maiden 
speech [as a newly-elected MP to the British House of Commons]. I was 
called in the second emergency debate on the American invasion of Grenada 
in 1983, and I spoke along these lines, [that] I didn’t really believe that we 
were in the business of giving independence to Commonwealth countries only 
to take it back because we didn’t like the leader. I was heard in silence – I 
later learned that is the tradition when a maiden speech is given – and you 
could have heard a pin drop. Then, in the toilet afterwards, I found myself 
beside Jim Callaghan, who said, “Mark, splendid speech that. What on earth 
are you doing in that party?” On which a voice from an inner cubicle, Roy 
Jenkins, said, “Absolutely right, Jim! He should be in mine.”  
 
SO: [Laughter] Yes. Just going back to that first CHOGM in London in 1977, 
it’s so often forgotten now just how much of a problem Idi Amin’s 
Uganda was at that particular point, with people emphasising South 
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Africa and Rhodesia as the great crises of the Commonwealth in the 
1970s and ‘80s. 
 
MR: When I was in Waldheim’s office, Amin came to New York. He came with a 
plane full of food for his party – which, of course, was impounded by the 
Americans. The West decided to boycott his reception and Waldheim wanted 
somebody with the look of a Brit. So, I went with Waldheim to the reception, 
met Amin, [and] found an extraordinary man. I knew the background, of 
course, but talking to him was a bit like talking to a very friendly child and it 
was perplexing to understand how he could ever hurt anyone. This was about 
1975. He got the ambassador to read his speech: it was like a brochure for 
the Ugandan tourist board. It went on and on and on. But in 1977, I was in 
Lancaster House in the run up to CHOGM. Ramphal called me over to his 
office and I found him sitting alone with Jim Callaghan. The Prime Minister 
said to me, “Mark, we’ve got these rumours that Amin is on his way to 
London, so could you please find out whether the rumours are true or not?” I 
said, “I will do my best,” left with head spinning and thought, “I’m just going to 
go to the Reuters tapes and see what is there.” I read the Reuters reports, 
reached a conclusion and decided to gamble with it. I went back in [and] said, 
“Prime Minister, I believe it’s a spoof,” and it was a spoof. 
 
SO: It was very successful in winding up the Brits! 
 
MR: Yes, and it was a media spoof – it wasn’t an Amin spoof. Somebody had 
done a little bit of colourful reporting… 
 
SO: And it had become embroidered and elaborated? 
 
MR: It had got on the Reuters tapes and went everywhere. 
 
SO: It acquired some momentum. 
 
MR: I had been through all that with Waldheim. I knew about it because, after the 
Entebbe raid, Waldheim was reported as condemning the Israeli intervention. 
It was never true. What had happened was something that he had said had 
been translated into Arabic for the Middle East news and then retranslated 
back and, of course, all hell had broken loose. The American media was 
screaming. Once something like that goes around the world it doesn’t matter 
how many denials you issue: you can never put the rabbit back in the hutch. 
So, I smelt the same sort of thing. There wasn’t time to ask anybody else. 
FCO officials to whom I spoke were unable to shed any light on the matter. 
 
SO: Mark, were you also being bombarded by messages from the Palace to 
confirm or deny this? 
 
MR: Jim Callaghan was being bombarded by messages from the Palace. It was a 
crisis meeting. I was the only staff called in. I was young and operating well 
above my pay grade! 
 
SO: It must have been very welcome news indeed, then, when you said, “He 
is not in the air.” 
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MR: But it was just the way it read on the tapes – that Amin was in the air – which 
caused all the trouble. It just didn’t make sense, and of course, I knew from 
Callaghan that the FCO had not had a single word from the High 
Commissioner in Kampala that Amin was on the move, which had already 
made them think he wasn’t on the way. But on hearing my assessment, the 
PM killed the story stone dead and it wasn’t an issue after that. 
 
SO: So, from what you observed then the relationship between Jim 
Callaghan and Sonny Ramphal was particularly good? 
 
MR: Very strong.  
 
SO: In contrast to the representation of the tense working relationship 
between Sonny Ramphal and Mrs Thatcher after 1979? 
 
MR: Well, the tenser relationship was between Peter Carrington and Ramphal. 
Carrington just couldn’t stand Ramphal and did not trust his political skills. 
 
SO: I have done a lot of research about the Lusaka CHOGM, as well as the 
whole Lancaster House negotiation process. I know that Carrington was 
very determined that this was going to be a British show and he was 
equally convinced that Sonny’s ‘outer diplomacy’ could significantly 
complicate things. Sonny Ramphal, on the other hand, felt that it was 
his responsibility to ensure the Commonwealth Secretariat provided the 
administrative backup for the Zimbabwe nationalist parties during the 
negotiations. 
 
MR: Let me tell you how I come into this. In the run up to the 1979 elections, 
Francis Pym was shadow Foreign Secretary and he came to see Ramphal 
with Richard Luce. I was present. We sat and talked about the possibilities for 
finding a solution to the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia situation. At the end of it, Pym 
looked at Ramphal and said, “Would you mind if Mark and Richard just keep 
in touch with each other?” Which we did. Then, of course, Pym wasn’t 
Foreign Secretary after the Conservatives came to power in 1979 – 
Carrington was – but Richard Luce kept the dialogue going. I would pop over 
to his office in the Foreign Office. I remember one day sitting [and] chatting 
privately to Richard, and I said, “Look, what you might have to think about is 
pulling down the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia flag and putting up the Union Jack and 
holding an election under our own flag.” Richard thought of it and said, 
“You’re crazy”, or words to that effect. 
 
SO: So, this is 1978, the time when…? 
 
MR: No, this is 1979 now. Margaret Thatcher was now in office. The dialogue kept 
going, even although Richard Luce’s boss had changed. 
 
SO: So, once he becomes Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the 
Foreign Office, after May of ‘79, that’s when, as you say, that 
relationship… 
 
MR: At his retirement party, Douglas Hurd said of me, “Now, I come to my PPS 
[Parliamentary Private Secretary]. The thing about Mark is he just has this 
knack of being around my office on a Thursday evening, so he would come in 
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and talk. He would have all these ideas. I would dismiss a lot of them and 
then come in on Monday morning and implement most of them.” I think there 
was a bit of this in regard to my Rhodesia conversations with Richard Luce. 
Richard obviously went away and thought about it and it could be that there 
were other people in the Foreign Office thinking along similar lines. Whatever 
[it was], such conversations can always be useful. 
 
SO: Talking of being useful, if I can just take you back to that first London 
CHOGM. You said that you accompanied Sonny Ramphal to the retreat 
at Gleneagles. What did you observe of the value of the retreat in terms 
of the diplomacy of the Commonwealth? How did it contribute to 
personal chemistry between heads of states? 
 
MR: It was enormous in those days and we couldn’t have got the Gleneagles 
Agreement on apartheid and sport without it. Ramphal came to Gleneagles 
with the draft [Agreement] in his pocket. If Margaret Thatcher had known of 
my role regarding the Gleneagles Agreement, she probably would never had 
made me a minister, but it was done before her time! [Laughter] 
 
SO: Probably not! So, why did you draft it? Where did those ideas come 
from, what were you drawing on? 
 
MR: It was drafted entirely in private. It was agreed [that] something had to be 
done about apartheid and sport. Ramphal had been sitting with people like 
John Syson and Roland Brown. There was a group of about nine, from what I 
recall. All would sit around Ramphal’s table, discussing the upcoming 
CHOGM. So, when I got to Gleneagles I had that draft and I was instructed by 
Ramphal to give it to every head of government personally. Most interesting, I 
got stuck in a lift with Robert Muldoon, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, 
and I said, “Oh, by the way, I’ve got a bit of paper here which the Secretary 
General has asked me to give you personally.” “What is it?” he said. I said, 
“It’s a draft of something called the Gleneagles agreement on apartheid and 
sport.” “Give it to me.” He didn’t look at it but folded it up and put it in his 
pocket. He said, “I think it will be better if I never read this because I will 
probably have to agree to it.” [Laughter] Which he did! Of course, it was the 
Callaghan era, so Ramphal would have cleared it with the Foreign Office. 
Who was the Foreign Secretary? 
 
SO: In 1977? It was David Owen. He took over from Anthony Crosland, who 
had died in February [of that year]. 
 
MR: That’s right. But I don't remember David Owen ever being part of an inner 
diplomacy at CHOGM. But he might have been. He wasn’t in Gleneagles, of 
course. In those days, foreign ministers didn’t go to CHOGM. The other 
person involved was… On the Sunday morning, I arrived at Lee Kuan Yew’s 
door and I said, “I’ve been asked by the Secretary General to give you a copy 
of the draft Gleneagles agreement on apartheid and sport.” He said, “I don’t 
do anything on a Sunday morning. Just put it on my desk.” He saw my 
hesitance and he said, “What you’ve got to understand about me is nobody 
ever dares read anything that is on my desk.” So, I just put it on his desk. 
[Laughter] In the end, it all went through nem con, after there was a private 
discussion. All sorts of things could happen at a retreat. We even heard that 
someone was trying to penetrate the perimeter without identification. Anyway, 
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we were having a meeting – as one does at CHOGMs – about nothing very 
much, if you know what I mean, such as, “How is the dinner going to run?”, 
blah, blah, all that sort of stuff. And suddenly, this harassed official burst in 
and said to John Henning, Head of the UK Conference Unit, saying, “We’ve 
got a break in.” Henning said, “What kind of break in?” and the reply was, 
“Well, there’s a man in slacks and a sweater with no identification, claiming to 
the Prime Minister of Canada,” to which Henning replied, “For God’s sake, let 
Pierre Trudeau back in!” [Laughter] Imagine that happening today! And then 
Janet Singh and I were escorting the Secretary General down to the banquet. 
We were three quarters of the way down the stairs when a cupboard door 
opened and there was Trudeau with a rose, handing it to Janet: “For my 
favourite lady.” [Laughter] So, you never knew what would happen next! 
 
SO: A colourful politician and a brilliant maverick! 
 
MR: Colourful, colourful. I had met Trudeau in Ramphal’s suite in New York before 
I joined the Secretariat. I may have arrived on the scene as a complete 
amateur, but I knew how to deal with people at the highest levels. The 
Foreign Office hadn’t a clue where I had come from, because it’s most 
unusual for somebody from the UK to suddenly pop up in the UN Secretary 
General’s offices. 
 
SO: And you hadn’t been on their radar at all? 
 
MR: I wasn’t on their radar at all, and of course to start with I wasn’t on the British 
quota. I was actually on a six month contract which could be renewed five 
times, up till 11 months. 
 
SO: Mark, I have several questions coming out of what you’ve said so far. 
The first of which concerns the diplomacy of getting the Gleneagles 
Agreement [approved]. Was there much private resistance? Or was this 
something that was felt, by Commonwealth consensus, to be an 
effective lever to demonstrate opposition to apartheid? 
 
MR: I think the Brits in the Callaghan era thought it was a very useful lever. It was 
a completely different attitude, and there was no problem with Malcolm 
Fraser. The one we all worried about was Robert Muldoon. 
 
SO: Because of the All Blacks? 
 
MR: Yes. Also, there was awkwardness that I hit when I was a Welsh sports 
minister in Wales, because there was no way of knowing how sports people 
would react, but in those days it was unlikely to be positive. 
 
SO: Indeed. 
 
MR: So, in terms of the diplomacy of achieving that agreement, there was 
extraordinary consensus, and the private diplomacy at the retreat was critical 
in ensuring this. The same can be said about the discussion on whether there 
should be a Commonwealth statement about respect for human rights. I know 
that Sonny Ramphal felt that there was a degree of inconsistency with 
opposition to apartheid and yet the Commonwealth was remarkably silent on 
human rights abuses in Uganda. Ramphal always had lots of subsidiary ideas 
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– some of which would fly, some of which wouldn’t fly. He was always very 
open in discussing, but never under-estimate the chair of a CHOGM, as that 
head of government has much more influence than they normally have when 
not in such a position, with the occasional exception such as Margaret 
Thatcher. The Brits were high on the influence factor in 1977. But then, in 
1979, I was in Kaunda’s study when the group of ten met with Mark Chona, 
President Kaunda’s Personal Assistant. Margaret Thatcher obviously liked 
what we were doing because they would talk and then the draft would come 
back and we would turn it into something and send it back. She said, “I think 
those two young men next door need a bit of help. Do you mind if I send 
someone to help them?” And Ramphal and Kaunda looked at each other and 
said, “If you wish.” So, that’s the first time I met Sir Antony Duff and do you 
know what he said? He said, “You two are doing a splendid job. I’m just going 
to sit and listen.” 
 
SO: I have to say, having interviewed the surviving members of Carrington’s 
team around Lancaster House, I have acquired an extraordinary respect 
for Tony Duff as a highly effective political operator who was 
remarkably tough, intelligent, and astute. 
 
MR: You see, although Moni Malhoutra was head of the Commonwealth Observer 
group, as I said, I had my own remit and so I got to know members of 
Soames’ team. When Ramphal came out to Salisbury just after Mugabe had 
won the election, he and I went to see the Governor and we were met by 
Soames and Tony Duff. The view of the NGOs during the election was that 
Tony Duff was the man who was likely to determine whether Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF should be proscribed or not. 
 
SO: Really? 
 
MR: He was seen as the hard man; he was the danger man. So, I was slightly 
surprised when Tony Duff walked with me behind Soames and Ramphal and 
said, “Mark, I think we’ve got the best possible result, don’t you?” But there 
were so many different views in and around Government House. Robert 
Jackson, the former Tory MP, was Soames’ special advisor and we had 
known each other from Oxford. I went out to dinner with him one night after I 
had been in Gwelo with one of the younger Australian Observers and we ran 
into Edson Zvobgo, the star of stage and screen, at Lancaster House. 
Because Bill Bowtell, assistant to the Australian Commonwealth Observer, 
had taken him all around Australian universities as a student leader, Bill knew 
how to share a drink with him. By the time he had consumed a second bottle 
of whisky, I was saying, “Now, Edson, tell me, what’s going to happen in the 
election in terms of seats?” And he looked at me and [started to say 
something], but I stopped him and said, “No, no; I don’t want all that bullshit.” I 
asked him three times and he turned to me finally and said, “All right, you 
bastard, I’ll tell you.” He told me exactly what ZANU were doing, [and] exactly 
how many seats Nkomo would win. I said, “What about Gwelo?” And he said, 
“Joshua will get eight; we’ll get four.” I said, “What about the Bishop?” And he 
said, “How many are we left with? Three or four, I suppose.” In fact, it was 
three in the final result. So, I told Robert this and I said, “I actually think this 
could be an accurate result.” He said. “Look, for God’s sake, don’t mention 
that to anyone anywhere near Government House because if it goes back to 
Number 10, she’ll go mad.”  
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SO: I’ve heard Carrington say there was a sweepstake in the Foreign Office 
at that particular time on who was likely to win. The most junior person 
responsible for Europe was the one who got it right, and Carrington 
said, “Bloody typical. The person who knows absolutely nothing about 
it!”  
 
MR: Well, I got it right. It was fed back to Ramphal, of course, because he was the 
man I was reporting to.  
 
SO: After the Lusaka CHOGM where you witnessed the personal diplomacy 
in Kaunda’s study and where the decision for the all-party conference 
under British chairmanship in London was made, what was your brief 
during the Lancaster House negotiations? 
 
MR: What happened, as you probably know, was that in the evenings the 
Commonwealth High Commissioners would meet in Marlborough House to 
discuss what had transpired in Lancaster House that day. So, I was sitting 
behind Ramphal through all of that and there were scare stories coming up all 
the time, [that] it was about to break down over x, y or z. Reports were also 
coming from Carrington’s office that Ramphal was messing the whole thing 
up. But there was so much of that and we got used to it. 
 
SO: What about the land deal?  
 
MR: No, I wasn’t involved with that. It was a bit of a sacred thing, which is why it 
got into the trouble that it did. 
 
SO: So, who was in the inner circle that dealt with the Lancaster House 
talks? 
 
MR: It was mainly the Brits. We at the Secretariat were not allowed to be involved 
in that, although we were very much involved outside Lancaster House. 
Ramphal and Emeka Anyaoku, then-Deputy Secretary General, worked hard 
on that. 
 
The Lusaka agreement was that there should be a Lancaster House 
conference. After that, when Mugabe, Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa and 
Ndabaningi Sithole were all in London, the Foreign Office were all trying to 
keep Ramphal as far away as possible and weren’t terribly keen for him to get 
out of Marlborough House. Of course, we were being fed back information all 
the time through Commonwealth High Commissioners [and] African 
Ambassadors, along with the key Zimbabwe political leaders, bearing in mind 
they had conflicting views. 
 
SO: And you maintained your close relationship with Richard Luce? 
 
MR: Not really at that time. There wasn’t time to do that. Events had moved to a 
completely different pace. There was no time for that kind of dialogue.  
 
SO: So, how important do you feel Ramphal was in helping to prevent the 
breakdown of negotiations at Lancaster House? 
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MR: I think he was very important because he built up very close relationships with 
Mugabe, Nkomo and – to a limited extent – with Muzorewa and Sithole, both 
of whom could cause unnecessary trouble if not handled with care. 
 
SO: So, that question of personal trust, that vital element of diplomacy… 
 
MR: And also in key diplomatic African missions – for instance, Ramphal was very 
close to Mwalimu [Julius Nyerere] and Kaunda. I drove Joan Wicken, Nyrere’s 
assistant, back from the Conservative Party Conference. I had made a 
speech at that conference defending Carrington. After I’d finished speaking, 
some lunatic got up and accused Margaret Thatcher of having blood on her 
dress for dancing with Kenneth Kaunda in Lusaka. We had thought we were 
going to lose the vote in that conference, something unheard of, but Robert 
Rhodes James started a slow hand clap that spread across the Blackpool 
Conference Hall just as the lunatic was attacking Maggie, so, we carried the 
day without a vote. 
 
SO: It was at that conference that there were banners reading ‘Hang 
Carrington’. 
 
MR: Yes, I believe so. 
 
SO: Julian Amery and his group. 
 
MR: Yes, and I had to speak in that atmosphere. But the moment Robert started to 
slow hand clap that was it. We won the day. I had never made a speech to an 
audience like that but I am also my strongest when I know what I am talking 
about. But in politics, you often have to speak without really knowing what you 
are talking about and I hated that. 
 
SO: You did, as a politician! Operating ‘on the fly’, as it were. Ramphal 
presents himself as being of critical importance in helping to bring the 
Americans on side to contribute to the land deal. Were you aware in any 
way of that? 
 
MR:  I was aware. I wasn’t involved, but I was aware those things were going on, 
yes. And it was awfully sensitive, because the Brits were happy to see some 
kind of a deal, but they didn’t want the white Rhodesians going mad. 
 
SO:  They wanted to keep the white Rhodesian skills in the country. They 
didn’t want financial or human capital flight. 
 
MR:  Yes. My step brother, Robin Bailey, moved there after the cease fire and still 
lives there. He knew all Soames’ people, as well as all the military people. He 
got me in with the monitoring force; he got me in everywhere. 
 
SO: So, you were sent out by Ramphal with this specific political brief? 
 
MR: Yes, [but] never in writing. 
 
SO: Wise. So, when did you arrive there? In December of ‘79? 
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MR: No, I arrived three days after the ceasefire came into effect in early January 
1980 and stayed right through. I stayed on to the independence ceremony. 
The first day I was there, I went with Peter Snelson to the northeast by plane 
to look at the route of a mobile polling station. When we got there, the airport 
hut was heavily sandbagged. On return, the District Commissioner said, “I 
didn’t want to tell you this, but that is the first time in eighteen months any 
white people have been down that route, and it’s the first time we haven’t 
been shot at.” But my mother, being South African, had always told me about 
the Bush telegraph. They knew why we were there.  
 
SO: So, you were part of the Commonwealth observer mission? 
 
MR: I was part of the executive group that ran the Commonwealth election 
observer mission, which included people like Derek Ingram. There were ten of 
us, I think. You have probably got the list somewhere. 
 
SO: I do. It was under the chairmanship of the Indian diplomat, Mr Rajeshwar 
Dayal, who had overseen the United Nations force going in to Congo. 
 
MR: Peter Snelson was part of the team. It was the first time I had met Derek and 
now Derek is a very old friend. He was our press spokesman. But I would be 
in places that other parts never reach, which was how I found myself at a 
reception given by the Governor which was hardly a diversified reception. I 
said to somebody, “Who’s that little man over there?” He said, “Oh, that’s 
General Walls.” I think I may have had one too many, so I marched up to him 
[and said], “General Walls, very nice to meet you. I’m Mark Robinson, 
Commonwealth observer group. Can I ask you a question?” He said, “By all 
means.” “Why won’t you meet with the Commonwealth Observer group?” He 
said, “I never knew they wanted to meet with me.” I said, “Well, Chairman 
Dayal would very much like to meet with you.” “Look,” he said. “Take this 
card. This is my PA. Call her first thing Monday morning.” He met Dayal and 
the observer group on the Wednesday. Dayal said, “Have you met all the 
leaders?” Walls said, “Yes, everyone except Mugabe.” He said, “Well, why on 
earth haven’t you met Mugabe?” “I don’t know; how do I get hold of him? 
Does he have a telephone number out there in the bush?” He met Mugabe 
that Friday and at that meeting he offered Walls – “when I am elected” – to 
continue his role as Commander of the Armed Forces, at least in the interim. 
It was one-to-one and you could argue that that was the most influential 
moment in the sense that it put the kibosh on any possible coup from that 
source. 
 
SO: I was going to ask you about this question of coups. 
 
MR: The coups. Many coups. Some true; some not. There was a march on the 
Saturday: all sorts of military people coming through Salisbury.  
 
Some days before the election, I was at a dinner party and I was chatting to 
the hostess and she suddenly yelled out [to her husband], “This man thinks 
Mugabe’s going to win the election. Darling, you must put my jewels in the 
bank.” “You bloody stupid woman,” he said. “He’ll nationalise the banks. I 
wouldn't do that if I was you.” Then he said to me, “You guys think you’re 
awfully clever, don’t you, coming here and sorting all this out.” He said, “Look 
around this table. Look at all the beautiful women. Where are their 
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boyfriends?” He said, “They’re dead. [They have] been killed in the bush. 
You’re here for one reason and one reason only. We are sick and tired of 
losing our young and we want this brought to an end.” Ramphal found such 
information very useful. I would phone him, but I never shared it with any of 
my colleagues. The Commonwealth Secretariat can be the most leaky place. 
 
SO: Can I ask you about the Commonwealth Secretariat as an international 
organisation? You’d come from the UNO. How did it compare? 
 
MR: I use this in speeches. The Commonwealth runs on a budget, I used to say, 
that wouldn’t pay for car parking at the UN. But the one that’s used now is 
that the total Commonwealth budget is less than the budget for the UN 
cafeteria. It’s tiny; it’s peanuts. And it’s the best value for money you can find, 
and funding governments are still chipping away at it. 
 
SO: So, coming, as you say, from the international organisation to the 
bureaucracy for a global subsystem, did it seem like a very small pond? 
I’m just trying to situate the Secretariat as representative of the broader 
Commonwealth… 
 
MR: I didn’t think about that very much, simply because I was allowed to use my 
political brain. Ramphal allowed me to think and extrapolate as he did with all 
his key staff. At the UN, Namibia crossed my path as well. One of my final 
tasks in the UN was to read through the final draft of the UNTAG Namibia 
plan for the SG. I said then it wouldn’t surprise me if Zimbabwe didn’t get 
independence before Namibia, which turned out to be true. In the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, we were doing distance learning courses for 
Namibians and all sorts of related things. 
 
SO: As far as the Commonwealth’s diplomatic activities were concerned, the 
Namibia issue was much more of a slow burn? 
 
MR: Very, very slow burn, because it was so big in the UN and it was the province 
of the trusteeship council. 
 
SO: So, was the Secretariat trying to stay in touch with the Contact Group? 
 
MR: Yes, it would, and Ramphal knew Martti Ahtisaari from Finland very well. The 
thing about Ramphal was that he seemed to know anyone who mattered well. 
 
SO: Yes, an excellent networker. 
 
MR: Yes. 
 
SO: Using that policy space to excellent effect. So, by March 1980, finally 
Zimbabwe had made the successful transition to internationally-
recognised independence. Had the Secretariat been in contact with 
Governor Soames, who came back and argued for a lot more money 
from the British government? 
 
MR: We were encouraging him to. Ramphal and Soames seemed to get on quite 
well. I remember Soames coming to a reception at the Jameson Hotel for the 
observers and I walked out with him and I said, “Don't get over worried about 
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the observers. The way things are going I think you could get a very good 
report on this election.” And he said, “I bloody hope you’re right.” But he said, 
“I am nervous.” He was nervous. What did he get? An extremely good report. 
I was involved in the drafting, as were many of my colleagues. 
 
SO: Derek Ingram said that there had been a crisis just at the point when – 
of course, it was a three-day poll – when some excitable journalist came 
hurrying in and said Coca-Cola washed the ink stamp off people’s 
fingers. Can you fill me in on that? 
 
MR: Journalists came in and said many things. It wasn’t, I believe, true. 
 
SO: No, it wasn’t, but Derek did say that he went haring out to buy some 
Coca-Cola to test this, as otherwise the election would be nullified! 
[Laughter] 
 
MR: To test it, yes; he would do. Indeed, I know he did so. It’s been heard in many 
other elections since: “some secret substance.” But then I have been an 
election observer on several occasions. I was out in the field on the last day, 
with two Nigerian observers in a private plane, and we were just dropping into 
polling stations – landing in the field and walking over. I remember being 
greeted by the British bobby, who looked splendid in his helmet miles out in 
the bush. “Excuse me, sir, I wonder if you could tell me which of these 
wallahs is allowed into the polling station and which aren’t.” So I said, “You 
see these two rather larger Nigerian gentlemen? They’re allowed in, but I’m 
not.” He said, “Oh, well, would you mind terribly coming in as well?” I said, “If 
you say so.” But you see, observers are observers – [they’re] not allowed to 
meddle. We got into one polling station and found that just through 
incompetence ballot boxes hadn’t been sealed properly. So we just quietly 
pointed that out to the local Zimbabwe officers. They said, “Could you help 
me do it?” I said, “If nobody’s looking, yeah, we will help. If it helps you, just 
do it and don’t talk about it afterwards.” Quite a lot of that went on in the first 
South African elections which I also observed.  
 
SO: Yes, I’m sure. 
 
MR: I remember seeing an old man who had walked three days to vote and he 
arrived one minute after the polls closed. Not being allowed to vote, he just 
shrugged his shoulders and started to walk back. One had to be terribly 
careful that you did not interfere. Every situation is different. It is not like the 
situation in Uganda where the rules said anyone who is in the queue at nine 
o’clock could vote. At that time, an official was sent to the end of the queue 
and anyone in front of that person could vote. Which reminds me, I forget 
which British election it was, where people in the queue at 10pm were not 
allowed to vote…? 
 
SO: Oh, it was the last one in 2010. 
 
MR: It was ridiculous. 
 
SO: It was. It was nonsensical. I remember turning up to vote and just 
declaring that this is where I live, and they took no ID whatsoever. 
 
13 
 
MR: But the people we had on our side [in Zimbabwe] were John Boynton’s polling 
officials, including a wonderful man called John Cumber. He was Save the 
Children deputy head. He used to draw these marvellous cartoons. Most had 
colonial experience and were absolutely on side with what the 
Commonwealth observers were trying to achieve. Government House, to start 
with, was horrified that we were insisting on setting up locally-based observer 
stations in the regions. There were strong arguments with Government 
House, but we insisted that the Commonwealth observer mission was not 
[composed of] people going out on little tourist packages to places like 
Victoria Falls and seeing if all is well. In the end, the Commonwealth observer 
group got everything it wanted, which was vital in securing local confidence. 
 
SO: In terms of getting everything you wanted, do you remember what your 
views were of South African activities? The presence of South African 
troops in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe at that particular time was very 
contentious, and there was the question of South African funding for 
the Muzorewa election campaign. 
 
MR: There was all that, but we didn’t really have to get involved. There was 
nothing we could do; there just was not time. What mattered was that we did 
well what we had been asked to do. In addition, much of what you heard was 
just rubbish, while the rest had a grain of truth in it. The sort of thing I found 
myself doing – and this is one example – was going right into the bush one 
day because some military commander had a whole lot of ‘terrs’, as they 
called them [Rhodesian slang for ‘terrorist’], in pens in breach of the 
ceasefire. We went to see for ourselves. The first car was ZANU-PF, then 
came the monitoring force vehicle with [other] key soldiers with me. So, we 
were in a Land Rover and [there were] two other vehicles, I think. We arrive in 
this camp in the middle of nowhere and the local officer in charge says, “Are 
you guys mad? These roads are mined. You come in a car: you must be 
crazy!” And I said, “ZANU-PF have come in a car in front of us because they 
know where the mines are. Now, we understand you are still holding some 
people.” “Yeah, well, the ceasefire doesn't work. I know that.” In essence, this 
local commander had gone maverick, and there were these guys in these 
cages – literally, in cages. Well, after a bit of chat and a drink – I think it was 
tea – he let them all go and they all rushed off to the nearest assembly point. 
They knew where it was. So, when we got back, of course, news of that 
success had spread. Bush telegraph. So, I never knew from one day to the 
next what I might be doing and then I would come back and have to catch up 
on the political developments. We were obsessed, in a way, with the threat of 
Mugabe being proscribed. It was a really serious threat and the reason it 
didn’t happen was because Soames spent a lot of time with his senior military 
officials, including Andrew Parker Bowles and people like that. He had thrown 
nice dinner parties for the military boys and he would hear from them. They 
made it quite clear and said, “If you proscribe Mugabe, our people will be 
taken hostage. They’re all armed in those camps and we haven’t made them 
give up their guns.” I saw them in those assembly points and it was like 
something from a spaghetti western film, with the ‘terrs’ covered in straps of 
ammunition, Kalashnikovs and the like. 
 
SO: As Soames said, “It was a wild thing, an African election.” 
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MR: In Zimbabwe it was a wild thing. It was a really wild thing. There were young 
white men in the Monomotapa Hotel at night playing Russian roulette. Horrific 
things going on. The day I left, after the independence ceremony, I sat back 
on the plane and the announcer said, "Comrade President, ladies and 
gentlemen, welcome aboard this flight.” Half the whites in the back were 
trying to get off the plane! [Laughter] I found myself doing a bit of, “Calm 
down, calm down. It’s perfectly all right. He is your Prime Minister now!” 
 
SO: A success, then; an unlikely success, but a success. How much did that 
innovative exercise in Commonwealth election observing roll directly 
into the Ugandan exercise? 
 
MR: Oh, this was the first. I was involved in the second Uganda exercise, not the 
first. I was in Arusha, Tanzania, organising a Commonwealth Health Ministers 
meeting, and Ramphal called and [asked if I] could go straight to Kampala. I 
said, “I’ve only come here for five days; I’ve hardly got any clothes. I would 
have to come back to London.” So, when I got back to London, he said, “I’ve 
had a much better idea. You’re going to be my man in London for this 
exercise and I’m sending Chris Laidlaw to Kampala.” It was a horrific mission. 
If I had gone to Kampala, I wouldn’t have been allowed on the second 
observer exercise, even though it was years later. But what I will tell you is 
that the system we set up in the first ever Commonwealth election observer 
mission has lasted. Chief Emeka Anyaoku, when Commonwealth Secretary 
General, slightly air-brushed this: you could be left to think he started it all. 
But they followed the Zimbabwe format in every single Commonwealth 
observer group held since – adapted, of course, to fit the individual 
circumstances of each mission. 
 
SO: So, those first Rhodesia/Zimbabwe elections served as the pilot study. 
Then Uganda, and then there was… 
 
MR: It was the same principles applied in Uganda but it was more hiding under the 
table. I heard shots being fired down the other end of my telephone. I was 
talking to Moni, who was hiding under a table, but Moni said, “Don’t worry too 
much. I think we are quite safe, they’re just celebrating the result.” Which 
turned out to be true. 
 
SO: Mark, thank you very much indeed. 
 
 
  [END OF AUDIOFILE PART ONE] 
